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ARTICLES 
FREE EXERCISE STANDING:  
EXTRA-CENTRALITY AS INJURY IN FACT 
BRENDAN T. BEERY† 
INTRODUCTION 
As American society and culture evolve, religious 
traditionalists find themselves increasingly anxious and 
put-upon.1  It is not easy moving from steward to mere fellow 
traveler, resigning one’s dominion over the most intimate affairs 
of neighbors less enamored with sectarian dogmas.  For the 
deposed lawgiver, psychic trauma results not from the tragic end 
of his hero story, but from the cruel irrelevance of his will—its 
slide from sovereign edict to sad, insistent noise, mere prattle.2  In  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† Professor of Law, Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School. 
J.D., summa cum laude, Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 1998; B.A., Bradley 
University, 1995. Thank you to my friend and colleague, WMU-Cooley Professor 
Emeritus Daniel R. Ray, for sharing his ideas and feedback. 
1 See ROBERT P. JONES, THE END OF WHITE CHRISTIAN AMERICA 40 (2017) 
(“Today, many white Christian Americans feel profoundly anxious.”). 
2 See Betty Glad, Why Tyrants Go Too Far: Malignant Narcissism and Absolute 
Power, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 1, 16 (Mar. 2002) (citation omitted) (summarizing 
psychological explanations for tyrannical behavior, and noting, citing numerous 
theories, that the tyrannical leader “makes claims for recognition and deference, and 
is enraged when it is not forthcoming”). The tyrant’s “control over his political 
environment may be used to win support for the grandiose visions of self. He can 
command an unusual deference of those in his inner circle and orchestrate worship.” 
Id. at 25. “[E]ven loneliness can be countermanded by commands for company at any 
time of the night or day.” Id. at 26. 
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a society where women largely make their own reproductive 
choices3 and same-sex couples may get married,4 religious 
traditionalists are quite obviously not making the rules anymore.  
So the movement to preserve traditional marriage and limit 
access to abortion, grounded though it is in our nation’s Goliathan 
religious and cultural traditions,5 nonetheless styles itself these 
days as the biblical David—the putative prey set up against bad 
odds, armed to take on towering depravity with nothing more than 
God’s Word tucked in its sling.6  In the legal realm, and 
particularly on a Supreme Court of the United States that now 
consists mostly of conservative Christians,7 this morphing in 
posture from aggressor to victim has birthed a new paradigm 
under which constitutional free exercise is no longer a promise to 
oppressed sects or the secular minority that they may practice or 
abstain from religious rites and beliefs as they see fit.  It is, rather, 
a prophylaxis guarding the religious majority against the insult of 
abiding outgroups and iconoclasts.8  As I have explained  
 
 
3 See Brendan T. Beery, Tiered Balancing and the Fate of Roe v. Wade: How the 
New Supreme Court Majority Could Turn the Undue-Burden Standard into a 
Deferential Pike Test, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 395 (2019) (“The proposition 
that a woman has an unenumerated constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy, at 
least before the point of fetal viability, won the day in 1973. But, as 2018 fades into 
2019, no judicial precedent is more endangered than the one that has evolved in a 
triumvirate of cases: Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
4 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
5 See JONES, supra note 1, at 39–40 (referring to “white Protestantism” as 
“arguably the most powerful cultural force in the history of our country”).  
6 See id. at 43–44 (“There is much at stake for the country in whether [white 
evangelical Christians] retreat into disengaged enclaves, band together to launch 
repeated rounds of what the sociologist Nathan Glazer has called ‘defensive 
offensives’—in which a formerly powerful majority recasts itself as a beleaguered 
minority in an attempt to preserve its particular social values—or find a way to 
integrate into the new American cultural landscape.”).  
7 See Julie Zauzmer, As Trump Picks Kavanaugh for the Supreme Court, 
Evangelicals Rejoice: ‘I Will Vote for Him Again’, WASH. POST (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/07/09/as-trump-picks-a-
supreme-court-justice-evangelicals-rejoice-i-will-vote-for-him-again (noting that “this 
cadre of evangelical voters . . . have received what they wanted — two nominations, 
enough to create a five-members conservative majority on the court”). 
8 See Greg Sargent, The Walls Around Trump Are Crumbling. Evangelicals May 
Be His Last Resort., WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/2019/01/02/walls-around-trump-are-crumbling-evangelicals-may-be-his-
last-resort/ (statement of Robert Jones, CEO & founder of the Public Religion 
Research Institute) (“[President Trump’s proposed border wall] embodies a white 
evangelical view of the world ‘as a dangerous battleground’ made up of ‘chosen insiders 
and threatening outsiders’ . . . .”). 
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elsewhere, under the emerging Supreme Court majority, free 
exercise will not be about freedom to—it will be about  
freedom from.9 
Whenever free exercise, legally, is to be applied in a 
prophylactic sense—when it is to function effectively to protect 
believers, and particularly adherents to prevailing majoritarian 
belief systems—courts have to find some cognizable harm in 
believers’ plight and inability to conform the world around them 
to their own codes of behavior.  After all, Article III of the United 
States Constitution excludes any matter that is not a case or 
controversy from federal court jurisdiction.10  One is entitled to 
judicial relief, therefore, only if one has standing—if one has  
been injured in some concrete way.11  To have standing in a 
constitutional case against the government, a litigant must have 
suffered an injury in fact fairly traceable to the conduct of the 
government where the injury is redressable by a court.12 
If I am a believer in scriptures and holy books and the 
rightness of my own reading of them, what am I to say about my 
new station—an unhappy place where, although I need not 
conform my beliefs or religious behaviors to anyone else’s liking, I 
must nonetheless suffer an awareness about my orbit of people 
and practices anathema to my own personal constitution?  What 
is the harm attendant to the irrelevance of my will?  What is the 
harm attendant to merely existing in a society where lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender (“LGBT”) rights must be abided and 
honored, or where other people may use contraceptive methods 
that I might call “abortifacients”?  What is the harm to me?  That 
I am aghast? 
In a sense, as it turns out, that is the harm.  As the Supreme 
Court takes up its station as custodian of traditional 
Judeo-Christian values and gives voice to conservative casualties 
of areligious insensitivity, such emotional harm will likely also 
constitute the “injury in fact” required to confer on a litigant legal 
standing to challenge secular governments’ laws and policies. 
 
9 See Brendan Beery, Prophylactic Free Exercise: The First Amendment and 
Religion in a Post-Kennedy World, 82 ALB. L. REV. 121, 122 (2018).  
10 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. 
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 471–75 (1982). 
11 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Intern., 
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). 
12 See id. 
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In light of this situation, the standing doctrine applied in some 
lower courts will have to yield to a new reality.  In a recent case, 
Nikolao v. Lyon, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals opined that a 
plaintiff in a free exercise case has suffered an injury in fact only 
if “the state compels her ‘to do or refrain from doing an act 
forbidden or required by one’s religion, or to affirm or disavow  
a belief forbidden or required by one’s religion.’ ”13  This 
conceptualization would be so, however, only if the exercise of 
religion were regarded as dynamic—as involving, in other words, 
“things like expressing belief, praying, gathering for worship 
services, [and] participating in rituals and sacraments and rites.”14  
If, on the other hand, the constitutional promise of free exercise 
entitles believers to a safe space—a space within which they are 
free from entangling themselves with the areligious choices of 
their fellow citizens—then this conception of injury will not do.15 
Part I of this Article surveys standing doctrine generally and 
tackles the problem of psychic insult—what might fairly, in some 
cases, be characterized as hurt feelings—as an injury.  Part II 
addresses the special problems of finding concrete and palpable 
injuries in religion cases, noting that it is more difficult to identify 
such injuries in Establishment Clause cases than in free exercise 
cases.  When free exercise is viewed as dynamic and kinetic, free 
exercise injuries are discernible and concrete:  they occur when a 
person is forced to participate in religious undertakings or express 
beliefs against his or her will, or when a person is forced to abstain 
from participating in religious undertakings or expressing his or 
her beliefs.  When free exercise is viewed as prophylactic, on the 
other hand, the alleged injuries become much more ethereal and 
abstruse:  a person may be injured, under this view, by a mere 
psychic insult.  
Part III discusses why religious traditionalists, and 
particularly Christian conservatives in the United States, see 
extra-centrality as a concrete injury.  It is in the nature of 
evangelism that non-adherents be evangelized; non-adherents are 
thus viewed as accessorial, and their participation in believers’ 
mission to correct and convert is therefore a component of 
believers’ free exercise of religion.  This view of the believer as 
central and all others as accessorial engenders the perception of 
 
13 875 F.3d 310, 316 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 
827 F.2d 1058, 1066 (6th Cir. 1987)).  
14 Beery, supra note 9, at 122.  
15 See id. at 128–35. 
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extra-centrality and irrelevance as injury.  And of course the loss 
of power by conservative Christians may itself be experienced as a 
concrete and palpable injury.  So too the tendency of Christians to 
see themselves as persecuted contributes to the perception of 
concrete and palpable injuries, even where secularists see mere 
governmental neutrality.  Part IV explains why the coercion 
standard elucidated in Nikolao cannot likely survive a new 
paradigm under which a majority of the Justices on the Supreme 
Court take a prophylactic view of free exercise and regard the 
extra-centrality of traditional Judeo-Christian norms in American 
life as a concrete and palpable injury. 
I. STANDING DOCTRINE GENERALLY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
HURT FEELINGS 
Standing doctrine is famously manipulated by judges who, 
however much they claim merely to generate mechanical outputs 
after sorting inputs through neutral and rigid interpretive 
models,16 are, after all, mere humans with their own agendas and 
policy preferences.17  As Professor Richard Pierce explains, “[a] 
lawyer would [say that a] plaintiff has standing to sue a defendant 
if the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer a legally cognizable 
and judicially redressable injury . . . .”18  A political scientist, on 
the other hand, would say that “standing depends on the degree of 
congruence between the political and ideological goals of the 
plaintiff and those of the judges who answer the standing 
question.”19  Be that as it may, courts generally view hurt  
feelings as the quintessence of an abstract or generalized  
non-justiciable “injury.”20 
 
16 See Joseph Kimble, What the Michigan Supreme Court Wrought in the Name of 
Textualism and Plain Meaning: A Study of Cases Overruled, 2000–2015, 62 WAYNE L. 
REV. 347, 354–55 (2017) (noting that while advocates claim that textualism is “fair to 
all sides because they know the interpretive ‘rules,’ or canons, from the outset” there 
is “strong evidence that many times in the real world of decision-making, [the canons] 
are put to ideological ends”). 
17 See generally, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. 
REV. 1741 (1999) (asserting that standing law is largely dependent upon the political 
agenda of the deciding judges). 
18 Id. at 1742. 
19 Id. 
20 See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976) 
(“Insofar as these organizations seek standing based on their special interest in the 
health problems of the poor their complaint must fail. Since they allege no injury to 
themselves as organizations, and indeed could not in the context of this suit, they can 
establish standing only as representatives of those of their members who have been 
injured in fact, and thus could have brought suit in their own right.”); O’Shea v. 
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In Allen v. Wright, widely regarded as the leading Supreme 
Court authority on standing,21 the parents of African American 
children alleged that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) fostered 
a de facto segregated school system after Brown v. Board of 
Education22 by failing to enforce its own rules, under which the 
IRS should have revoked the tax-exempt status of private schools 
that discriminated on the basis of ethnicity.23  The parents alleged 
that the existence of a segregated school system sent a message to 
African American children that having to function within such a 
system caused “stigmatic injury, or denigration.”24  As to this claim 
of injury, the Court stated, “If the abstract stigmatic injury were 
cognizable, standing would extend nationwide to all members of 
the particular racial groups against which the Government was 
alleged to be discriminating . . . regardless of . . . location . . . .”25  
The Court fretted that, for example, “[a] black person in Hawaii 
could challenge the grant of a tax exemption to a racially 
discriminatory school in Maine.  Recognition of standing in such 
circumstances would transform the federal courts into ‘no more 
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of 
concerned bystanders.’ ”26   
State courts may apply standing rules that are stricter or 
looser than the rules governing Article III standing in federal 
courts.27  Nonetheless, “[a]n overwhelming majority of states apply 
 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (citation omitted) (“Abstract injury is not enough. 
It must be alleged that the plaintiff has ‘sustained or is immediately in danger of 
sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged statute or conduct.”); 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (“It is clear that an organization whose 
members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review. 
But a mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no 
matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient 
by itself to render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved’ within the 
meaning of the [Administrative Procedures Act].”) (alteration in original). I tell 
students to consider whether the problem is of the sort one might discuss with one’s 
spiritual advisor, psychotherapist, or bartender. If it is, then it might not be the proper 
subject for adjudication. 
21 See John Harrison, Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative 
Lawsuits, 31 J. L. & POL. 103, 135 (2015). 
22 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
23 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 746 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Intern., Inc. 
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). 
24 Id. at 754. 
25 Id. at 755–56. 
26 Id. at 756 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). 
27 See Paul J. Katz, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal Standing 
Doctrine, and the Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1345–46 (2005) 
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some type of constitutional standing doctrine,” and many have 
adopted standards similar to the standing rules applied in federal 
courts.28  Consider, merely as an example, American Family 
Association of Michigan v. Michigan State University Board of 
Trustees, a case in which I participated as coauthor of an amicus 
brief.29  In that case, the American Family Association of Michigan 
claimed that its mission was “to promote the welfare of children 
through the promotion and preservation of the traditional family 
in our society.”30  The Association challenged a university policy 
under which medical benefits were provided to the same-sex 
partners of some university employees.31  As to the Association’s 
claim of injury, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated, “Plaintiff 
asserts that defendant’s benefits policy advances an interest 
contrary to plaintiff’s mission and that the policy is ‘at odds with 
that which plaintiff seeks to promote.’ ”32  In reference to that 
claim of injury, the court stated, “Plaintiff essentially complains 
that defendant’s benefits policy is an affront to the values that 
plaintiff and its members espouse and promote.  Accordingly, 
plaintiff has not established that it suffered a concrete and 
particularized, actual or imminent injury distinct from that of the 
citizenry at large . . . .”33 
In both federal and state courts, then, jurists tend to eschew 
claims of injury reflecting some amorphous sense of psychic upset, 
even when those feelings accompany an injustice as palpable as 
racial discrimination.  One scholar has noted that the Supreme 
Court’s reticence to recognize stigmatic harm as a cognizable 
injury might, in some circumstances, be short-sighted:   
In brief, stigma is a mark of disgrace imposed on individuals who 
possess a characteristic or trait that society views as deeply 
discrediting.  This mark spoils the social identity of its bearer and 
reduces him “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, 
discounted one.”  Stigma invites discrimination and prejudice 
against the stigmatized, poses threats to their self-esteem, and 
creates self-doubt that can diminish their abilities, thus 
 
(explaining that state courts may apply standing rules that are stricter or looser than 
federal standing rules even when applying federal law).  
28 Wyatt Sassman, A Survey of Constitutional Standing in State Courts, 8 KY. J. 
EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 349, 353 & n.14 (2015–2016). 
29 739 N.W.2d 908, 910 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). 
30 Id. 
31 See id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 915–16. 
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confirming the very stereotypes that help generate stigma in the 
first place.  These injuries are as significant and concrete as other 
injuries the Court has recognized.  Moreover, these harms 
distinguish the stigmatized individual from a concerned 
bystander who merely seeks to vindicate value interests.34 
It is especially puzzling that Justice O’Connor, who authored 
the Court’s Allen opinion, was so dismissive of stigmatic harm as 
a cognizable injury in the context of racial discrimination.  Justice 
O’Connor, after all, “wrote that governmental endorsement of 
religion is impermissible because it ‘sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.’ ”35  But as will be discussed immediately below, 
Justice O’Connor’s more accommodating approach to standing in 
religion cases might have to do with how difficult it can be to 
identify a concrete injury in some of those cases. 
II. STANDING IN RELIGION CASES 
As I have summarized elsewhere, 
There are two religion clauses in the Constitution.  The first is 
the Establishment Clause, which is widely understood  
as enjoining governmental entanglement with religion, 
endorsement of religion, or coercion.  According to the Supreme 
Court, the principle undergirding the Establishment Clause is 
neutrality:  the government may not favor religion over non-
religion, non-religion over religion, or one religion over another.  
 
The second is the Free Exercise Clause, which is also understood, 
as a matter of the political philosophy prevailing at the time [of] 
the Constitution’s drafting, as requiring the government to be 
neutral as to religion—as to its existence and its exercise in the 
lives of citizens:  “[The] history [of the union of church and state] 
prompted John Locke to urge toleration and stress the necessity 
of distinguishing ‘the business of civil government from that of 
religion’ and establishing clear boundaries between them.”36  
 
34 Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417, 422 (2007) 
(citations omitted).  
35 Id. at 437 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring)). 
36 Beery, supra note 9, at 123–24 (alterations in original) (quoting Priests for Life 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 808 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Brown, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)). 
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It is not hard to see how governmental interference in the free 
exercise of religion might result in a concrete and palpable injury:  
being forced to participate in or refrain from some prayer, rite, 
sacrament, or expression of belief goes well beyond the merely 
hypothetical or speculative, and well beyond the realm of merely 
hurt feelings.  But what is the injury in the typical Establishment 
Clause case—when the government gives aid to religious schools,37 
displays a creche on public property,38 or merely permits the 
recitation of a prayer before a public-school football game?39  The 
issue of standing in Establishment Clause cases has befuddled 
courts for decades,40 and as discussed below, the issue of standing 
in Free Exercise Clause cases is becoming something of a hash, 
too. 
A. Establishment 
“[T]he concept of injury for standing purposes is particularly 
elusive in Establishment Clause cases.”41  Cases arising under the 
Establishment Clause often fall into one or more of three 
categories: cases involving governmental aid, money or materials, 
provided to religious organizations;42 religious displays on public 
property;43 or some kind of prayer, religious instruction, or 
promotion of religion in public schools.44  Of the two religion 
clauses, it is easier to see the difficulty in articulating an injury in 
establishment cases: 
Several of the Court’s Establishment Clause cases might . . . be 
understood as resting, at least implicitly, on stigmatic harm.  In 
many Establishment Clause cases, the plaintiff argues that his 
tax dollars are being improperly used to support an 
establishment of religion.  The injury in these cases is the 
plaintiff’s loss of money . . . . But in many religious display cases 
the challenged conduct . . . costs no money . . . . 
 
 
37 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000). 
38 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670–71 (1984). 
39 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000). 
40 See Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 691 (11th Cir. 1987). 
41 Id. 
42 See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801. 
43 See, e.g., Allegheny Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 
(1989); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670–71. 
44 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 294; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 580 (1992), Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580–81 (1987). 
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If the plaintiffs in these cases are not complaining about the loss 
of tax dollars, what exactly is their injury?  Some lower courts 
have held that a plaintiff is injured if he has altered his conduct 
to avoid seeing an offensive religious display.  Other courts have 
held that a plaintiff is injured if he is forced to confront an 
offending display as part of his regular routine, even if he does 
not alter his conduct to avoid the display.  The Supreme Court 
has not embraced either approach, although it has hinted that a 
plaintiff who wishes to challenge a religious display must 
encounter the display on a regular basis. 
 
In the absence of an explanation from the Court, some scholars 
suggest the answer can be found in the endorsement test, first 
articulated by Justice O’Connor . . . . “The Establishment 
Clause,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “prohibits government from 
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s 
standing in the political community.”  She then wrote that 
governmental endorsement of religion is impermissible because 
it “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not 
full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of 
the political community.” 
 
O’Connor’s discussion of endorsement was directed to the merits 
of the case, not the issue of standing.  But it sheds light on her 
view of the injury in religious display cases.  Plaintiffs in these 
cases are harmed, she implies, because the government’s 
endorsement of religion casts them as outsiders, as second-class 
citizens not deserving of the same consideration given to 
adherents.  Though not described as stigmatic harm, this injury 
sounds very much like the denigration alleged by the African 
American parents in Allen. . . . 
 
The Court has never formally linked the endorsement test to the 
issue of standing.  But a majority of the Court has adopted 
O’Connor’s test as one way to determine whether government 
action violates the Establishment Clause.  Thus, one might 
conclude that standing in religious display cases rests, at least in 
part, on the stigmatic harm inflicted by governmental 
endorsement of religion.45 
 
 
45 Healy, supra note 34, at 436–38 (first quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring); then quoting id. at 687–88). 
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The difficulty in articulating a concrete injury in 
Establishment Clause cases may be the genesis of the 
taxpayer-standing rule articulated in Flast v. Cohen.46  As a 
general matter, a person does not have standing to challenge a 
federal governmental law or policy merely because that person is 
a taxpayer.47  Taxpayer status indicates the presence of a 
generalized rather than particularized grievance.48  In Flast, the 
plaintiffs alleged that they had standing as taxpayers to challenge 
a federal program under which books and material were provided 
to religious schools.49 
In a somewhat tortured exercise, the Court carved out an 
exception to the general prohibition against federal taxpayer 
standing when a plaintiff taxpayer demonstrates that she is 
challenging an exercise of congressional taxing and spending—
rather than its regulatory power more broadly—and when a 
logical nexus between taxpayer status and the challenged law can 
be established by showing a distinct textual limitation on 
Congress’s power to tax and spend.50  The Court held that the 
plaintiffs in Flast had met this test.51  First, the Court noted that 
they challenged a congressional spending program rather than 
Congress’s broad authority to regulate.52  Second, as a historical 
matter, the Court concluded that the Establishment Clause was 
intended to limit Congress’s authority to spend taxpayers’ money 
on religion and thereby force taxpayers to participate in religious 
establishment.53 
 
 
 
 
46 392 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1968).  
47 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). 
48 See id. 
49 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 85–86. 
50 See id. at 103. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
James Madison, who is generally recognized as the leading architect of the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment, observed in his famous Memorial 
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments that “the same authority 
which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for 
the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other 
establishment in all cases whatsoever.” 
Id. (quoting 2 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed., 1901)).  
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Indulging this kind of contortionism bespeaks the difficulty in 
identifying a concrete injury when the government promotes 
religion.54  Since the promotion of religion is not a zero-sum 
enterprise where help to one necessarily comes at the 
demonstrable and particularized expense of another,55 one 
struggles to see where any person might allege a concrete injury 
in such cases.  That being so, courts would rarely if ever get at the 
issue; and if courts want to get at the issue, they will have to 
undertake the legal fictions and machinations characterized by 
the Flast decision in search of some cognizable injury.  As 
Professor Thomas Healy noted in his incisive article, Stigmatic 
Harm, finding an injury is even more difficult in cases involving 
public displays,56 and the same might be said for prayer in 
schools.57  Really, what is one to say when one sues to challenge a 
religious display or a religious incantation?  It bothered me 
terribly?58 
 
54 See Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing To 
Challenge Faith-Based Spending, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1009, 1017–18 (2011) (citations 
omitted). Professor Rahdert explains: 
The difficulties the Court has encountered in standing law have been 
particularly vivid in cases involving the Establishment Clause. . . . Each 
major period of establishment jurisprudence has been marked by vigorous 
judicial debate over the proper limits of standing in cases addressing the 
relations of religion, church and state. Sometimes the Court has rejected 
standing on controversial Establishment Clause questions. At other 
junctures, it has loosened the knots of standing law to enable establishment 
challenges that might otherwise evade resolution. At times it has treated the 
Establishment Clause as a special case, calling for unique (and more 
generous) standing rules. At others it has insisted on treating establishment 
matters by the same rules that apply elsewhere, albeit with the same 
indeterminacy. In most periods, a coherent approach to standing in 
establishment matters has eluded the Court’s grasp.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
55 An example of a zero-sum enterprise is when an affirmative action program 
intended to promote opportunities for ethnic minorities sometimes necessarily 
requires the exclusion of a non-minority individual from a certain job or a seat at a 
certain school. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307–08 (1978). 
56 Healy, supra note 34, at 436–38 (citations omitted). 
57 See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
58 See Rahdert, supra note 54, at 1018–19. Professor Rahdert notes: 
One of the most persistent sources of controversy concerns the relative roles 
of tangible “pocket-book” and intangible “psychic” injury in conferring 
Establishment Clause standing. Some Justices, notably including Justice 
Jackson . . . and Justice Scalia . . . , have suggested that the absence of 
significant discernible and reasonably direct pecuniary or other tangible 
harm ought to counsel heavily against Establishment Clause standing. Yet 
in other situations, such as its public school prayer decisions, the Court has 
treated non-pecuniary psychic harm as a sufficient ground for jurisdiction, 
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If the Establishment Clause is more about the government 
refraining from its own participation in religion and the Free 
Exercise Clause is more about the government abstaining from 
interference in the religious beliefs and practices of individuals 
under the government’s jurisdiction, it would seem that the latter 
would engender injuries far more concrete than the former, 
making it easier to find a plaintiff with standing to sue for an 
alleged free exercise violation.  In Flast, the Court stated that 
“standing requirements will vary in First Amendment religion 
cases depending upon whether the party raises an Establishment 
Clause claim or a claim under the Free Exercise Clause.”59  But 
the Court applied its taxpayer-nexus exception only in the context 
of the Establishment Clause:  “We have noted that the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does specifically 
limit the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, [§] 8.  
Whether the Constitution contains other specific limitations can 
be determined only in the context of future cases.”60 
The Court’s reticence to wade into the shallows of free exercise 
with its new taxpayer-standing doctrine likely resulted from its 
understanding that such intellectual gymnastics would not be 
necessary for a plaintiff who might allege, for example, that the 
government had either made her pray a prayer that she did not 
want to pray or made her abstain from a prayer that she did want 
to pray.  There is nothing ethereal or abstruse about the injury in 
such a case; the injury is, rather, palpable and easily discernible.  
B. Free Exercise 
As it turns out, however, courts are flirting with a much looser 
standard for standing in Free Exercise Clause cases even as they 
tighten up those standards with regard to the Establishment 
 
though the Justices have sometimes debated whether or not such harm 
needs to approach coercion. The Justices have also debated the degree to 
which the source of psychic harm and the directness of its mode of operation 
matter. These judgments influence the Court’s willingness to consider 
taxpayer standing, since they affect the degree to which the taxpayer’s 
relatively symbolic pecuniary harm can be buttressed by appeals to 
intangible psychic injury. In general, the broader the role of psychic harm, 
the less the presence or absence of pocketbook injury should matter. Debates 
over the status of taxpayers in Establishment Clause litigation consequently 
become, in effect, coded debates about the kinds of degrees of intangible harm 
the Establishment Clause is meant to redress.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
59 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). 
60 Id. at 105. 
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Clause.  As to the Establishment Clause, when the Supreme Court 
made the turn from the more liberal Warren era to the more 
conservative Rehnquist era,61 it narrowed the scope of the Flast 
exception to the general prohibition against taxpayer standing by 
explicitly stating that the Flast exception applied to only 
appropriations of funds by the legislative branch.62 
 
To that end, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, the Court held that 
taxpayers lacked standing to challenge the transfer of a large and 
valuable tract of land to a Christian college by a federal executive 
agency.63  The lesson was well learned, and when President George 
W. Bush created an “Office of Faith-Based Initiatives,” the office 
and its satellite offices in federal agencies were empowered not to 
appropriate funds, but to assist religious organizations in their 
efforts to qualify for federal money.64  Once again, the Supreme 
Court held that no mere taxpayer had standing to challenge the 
expressly faith-friendly program.65  
In Establishment Clause cases under the conservative 
majority on the Court, then, a plaintiff must allege a concrete  
and particularized injury.  Furthermore, “the psychological 
consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with 
which one disagrees” does not constitute “an injury sufficient to 
confer standing under Art. III.”66  And if that means that no one 
has standing, that would seem to suit the Court.  In Valley Forge 
Christian College, the Court stated, “[t]he assumption that if 
[certain parties] have no standing to sue, no one would have 
standing, is not a reason to find standing.”67 
Justice Gorsuch, with Justice Thomas joining him, recently 
illuminated the likely way forward for the Court in Establishment 
Clause cases.  In his concurring opinion in American Legion v. 
American Humanist Association, Justice Gorsuch wrote: 
 
61 See Frank B. Cross, et al., Warren Court Precedents in the Rehnquist Court, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 3, 8 (2007) (“One might expect the relatively conservative 
Rehnquist Court to make limited use of the relatively liberal Warren Court 
precedents.”). 
62 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and 
State, 454 U.S. 464, 478–79, 481 (1982). 
63 Id. at 479–80.  
64 See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593–95 (2007). 
65 See id. at 608–09. 
66 Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 485. 
67 Id. at 489 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)). 
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The [American Humanist] Association claims that its members 
“regularly” come into “unwelcome direct contact” with a World 
War I memorial cross . . . “while driving in the area.”  And this, 
the Association suggests, is enough to allow it to insist on a 
federal judicial decree ordering the memorial’s removal.68 
Somewhat derisively, Justice Gorsuch continued, “Maybe, the 
Association concedes, others who are less offended lack standing 
to sue.  Maybe others . . . who come into contact with the memorial 
too infrequently lack standing as well.  But . . . its members are 
offended enough—and with sufficient frequency—that they may 
sue.”69  Justice Gorsuch then stated, consistently with the Court’s 
apparent view in Valley Forge Christian College, “[t]his ‘offended 
observer’ theory of standing has no basis in law.”70 
At the same time, in Free Exercise Clause cases,71 
conservative federal judges have gone so far as to find a 
substantial burden where the government has required no more 
than that an employer provide health insurance plans to 
employees that include contraceptive coverage,72 or that employers 
may opt out of providing such coverage by filing a form.73 
This new paradigm, a narrower view of Establishment Clause 
standing and a broader view of free exercise standing—at least a 
free exercise injury—is consistent with a federal judiciary that is 
inclined to see a robust role for religion, and particularly the 
religious beliefs and practices associated with conservative 
Christianity, in public life.74  Such an attitude would, naturally, 
 
68 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2098 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (quoting Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning 
Comm’n, 874 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Am.  
Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019)). 
69 Id. (citations omitted). 
70 Id. 
71 Some of these cases arise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”), which, like the First Amendment itself, requires judicial intervention when 
a government “substantially burdens the exercise of religion.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 690 (2014). 
72 See id. at 691–92. 
73 See generally Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 772 
F.3d 229, (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)  
(per curiam)). 
74 See Katherine Stewart, Opinion, Whose Religious Liberty Is It Anyway?,  
N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/opinion/kavanaugh-
supreme-court-religious-liberty.html. Stewart wrote: 
In answer to [Senator Ted] Cruz’s invitation to discuss “religious liberty,” 
Judge Kavanaugh spoke movingly about the suffering of those who were 
prevented from bringing their religion into “the public square.” But he had 
next to nothing to say about the benefits that have flowed . . . from the many 
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lead one to limit access to courts for those who see some difficulty 
with the government promoting favored religious beliefs while 
providing access to those who see secular laws as burdening 
favored religious beliefs.  This attitude also reflects a shift in the 
way judges define free exercise, as will be discussed more 
thoroughly below; whereas free exercise was once seen as dynamic 
in nature, it is now seen as prophylactic.75  A free exercise injury, 
therefore, may now be alleged not only by someone claiming  
active interference in her beliefs or practices, but also by someone 
claiming that her participation in the secular social compact is 
itself injurious when secular laws fail to accommodate her 
religious sensibilities.76  
1. When Free Exercise is Dynamic 
There was a time, particularly when Justice Scalia was 
interpreting the law, when suspicions about free exercise claims 
running amok led the Supreme Court to take a narrow view of the 
Free Exercise Clause’s reach.  For example, when adherents to a 
Native American religion claimed a free exercise right to use 
peyote as part of their religious rites and rituals,77 the Court, with 
Justice Scalia writing for the majority, stated: 
But the “exercise of religion” often involves not only belief and 
profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical 
acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating 
in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining 
from certain foods or certain modes of transportation.  It would 
 
landmark decisions that have prevented religious groups from using the 
power of the state to impose their views. He endorsed the appeal to “history 
and tradition” in justifying the mixing of religion and government functions, 
but showed no awareness that such appeals invariably confer privilege on 
those religions best able to claim this history for themselves. He celebrated 
recent rulings that establish the right of religious groups to participate in 
“public programs,” but failed to note that the concerns those rulings raise 
have to do with the use of taxpayer funds by religious groups whose beliefs 
are not universally shared – and whose discriminatory practices are at odds 
with laws that apply to the rest of the nonprofit (and for-profit) 
world. . . . Judge Kavanaugh’s disdain for the separation of church and state 
will matter in decisions that go well beyond the usual battlegrounds in the 
culture war.  
Id. 
75 See Beery, supra note 9, at 128–35. 
76 See Stewart, supra note 74 (“Let’s call it by its true name: religious privilege, 
not religious liberty. Today’s Christian nationalists want the ability to override the 
law where it conflicts with their religious beliefs, and thus to withdraw from the social 
contract that binds the rest of us together as a nation.”). 
77 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874, 878 (1990).  
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be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), 
that a State would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” 
if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are 
engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious 
belief that they display.  It would doubtless be unconstitutional, 
for example, to ban the casting of “statues that are to be used for 
worship purposes,” or to prohibit bowing down before a golden 
calf. 
 
[The religious objectors] in the present case, however, seek to 
carry the meaning of “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” 
one large step further.  They contend that their religious 
motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach of a 
criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious 
practice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those 
who use the drug for other reasons.  They assert, in other words, 
that “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” includes requiring 
any individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires 
(or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief 
forbids (or requires).  As a textual matter, we do not think the 
words must be given that meaning.  It is no more necessary to 
regard the collection of a general tax, for example, as “prohibiting 
the free exercise [of religion]” by those citizens who believe 
support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to regard 
the same tax as “abridging the freedom . . . of the press” of those 
publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of 
staying in business.  It is a permissible reading of the text, in the 
one case as in the other, to say that if prohibiting the exercise of 
religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of 
the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been 
offended.78 
Under this view, the Free Exercise Clause is violated only 
when the government intentionally targets certain beliefs because 
of their religious nature or when the government manifestly 
interferes with one’s religious practices or abstentions because of 
their religious nature.  In the same vein, in Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court struck down an  
 
 
 
 
 
78 Id. at 877–78 (second alteration added).  
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ordinance that was plainly directed against religious practices in 
that it barred the practice of animal sacrifice, but only when 
undertaken in the context of a religious ritual of some kind.79 
This view of free exercise makes sense.  Were the Court to 
indulge a broader view, one that accommodates objections to laws 
or policies that do not target activities or beliefs based on their 
religiosity, the attendant mischief would be easy to imagine:  a 
person claiming, while being cited for speeding, that she must 
travel at least ninety miles per hour to commune with the 
almighty; or a person claiming immunity from arson statutes on 
the basis of his fire worship; or, of course, the likely rampant 
emergence of a widespread religious objection to paying taxes.  
And this narrower view of the Free Exercise Clause’s reach 
comports with the common understanding of the word exercise: 
There seems some confusion about the word exercise.  Exercise 
means “the act of bringing into play or realizing in action.”  It is 
“[a]n activity carried out for a specific purpose.”  To exercise 
something is to engage in “the use of something.”  “If you exercise 
something such as your authority, your rights, or a good quality, 
you use it or put it into effect.”  The exercise of something cannot, 
by definition (it would seem), be passive or inert.  The exercise of 
something is, rather, active and kinetic—it is dynamic.80 
Indeed, the further back one goes in search of the meaning of the 
word “exercise,” the more dynamic “exercise” seems to be.  
According to the 1828 American Dictionary of the English 
Language, exercise meant:   
In a general sense, any kind of work, labor or exertion of body.  
Hence, (1) Use; practice; the exertions and movements customary 
in the performance of business; as the exercise of an art, trade, 
occupation, or profession [or] (2) Practice; performance; as the 
exercise of religion [or] . . . (10) Act of divine worship. . . .81 
 
79 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,  
535–36, 547 (1993). 
80 Beery, supra note 9, at 125 (quoting Exercise, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 
(online ed.), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exercise (last visited Oct. 9, 
2019)); Exercise, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES (online ed.), https://en.oxford 
dictionaries.com/definition/exercise (last visited Oct. 9, 2019); Exercise, CAMBRIDGE 
ENG. DICTIONARY (online ed.), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/ 
exercise (last visited Oct. 9, 2019); Exercise, COLLINS ENG. DICTIONARY (online ed.), 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/exercise (last visited Oct.  
9, 2019)). 
81 Exercise, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1828 (online ed.), http://webstersdictionary 
1828.com/Dictionary/exercise (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
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So the government, when the term free exercise is properly 
understood, need not accommodate believers’ every sensitivity; it 
must, rather, keep out of their business when they undertake 
religious activities or put their religious rites and rituals to use.  
The exercise of religion is not passive; it requires exertion and the 
practice or performance of religious acts—acts of worship or 
expressions of belief.  If this is what free exercise means, then a 
free exercise injury would result only from a governmental law or 
policy that requires, in some concrete and palpable way, that 
individuals either perform and practice religious acts anathema to 
their beliefs and consciences or that they abstain from the practice 
and performance of acts of worship or expressions of belief.  
Certainly, there is no room here for “injuries” grounded in the 
mere application of secular laws intended to promote the general 
welfare.  
2. When Free Exercise is Prophylactic 
Nonetheless, the Court, particularly with Justice Kavanaugh 
now among its number, is drifting toward the view that the Free 
Exercise Clause, rather than vindicating the individual’s right to 
practice and perform her religion and to undertake acts of worship 
consistent with her beliefs, additionally functions as a prophylaxis 
shielding the believer,82 even in her religious latency, from having 
to participate in a society where her beliefs are not accommodated 
by the government.83  
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court 
ruled that the federal government, under the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”),84 could not require that employers provide employees 
with health-insurance coverage that, in turn, provided 
contraceptive coverage.85  Writing for the Court, Justice Alito 
avoided the question of standing, but noted, “If the owners comply 
with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be facilitating 
abortions . . . .”86  Justice Alito did not state that the owners 
actually would be facilitating abortions.  Rather, it was enough of 
 
82 Indeed, Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas recently signaled a 
willingness to revisit Employment Division v. Smith. See Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Chemerinsky: Supreme Court’s Recent Actions are Telltale Signs of Its  
Future Direction, ABA J. (Feb. 7, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
chemerinsky-courts-recent-actions-offer-taste-of-the-future/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
83 See generally Beery, supra note 9. 
84 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2018). 
85 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–91 (2014). 
86 Id. at 691 (emphasis added). 
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an injury to implicate free exercise rights—in this case, under 
RFRA87—merely to allege that the owners believed that they may 
be complicit in the sins of third parties.  
In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the 
Supreme Court invalidated a provision in the Missouri 
Constitution that barred the state from providing public  
aid to religious organizations.88  Pursuant to Missouri’s 
anti-establishment constitutional provision, Trinity Lutheran 
Church was denied permission to participate in a state-run 
scrap-tire program under which aid recipients could repave 
surfaces on their property with tar made from recycled tires.89  
Missouri argued that its constitutional ban on government 
entanglement with religious organizations did “not prohibit the 
Church from engaging in any religious conduct or otherwise 
exercising its religious rights” and therefore did “not meaningfully 
burden the Church’s free exercise rights.”90  But the Court, per 
Chief Justice Roberts, held that Missouri’s anti-establishment 
provision “punished the free exercise of religion” by putting 
would-be aid recipients to the choice whether to give up the aid or 
give up their religious natures.91  The Court went so far as to opine 
that Missouri’s provision would require Trinity Lutheran Church 
to “renounce its religious character.”92  Under this view of free 
exercise, religious adherents are “shielded even from the insult of 
state neutrality.”93  
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, a bakery shop owner refused to design a cake for a 
same-sex couple’s wedding in defiance of a Colorado civil rights 
law that required him to do so.94  “The Court, per Justice 
Kennedy . . . wagged its finger at the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission and gave it a stern talking-to about impartiality and 
respect, holding merely that . . . the state had been partial in its 
dealings with the cake maker.”95  But how did the cake maker have 
 
87 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2018). 
88 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017, 2024–25 (2017). 
89 Id. at 2017. 
90 Id. at 2022. 
91 Id. at 2021-22 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978)). 
92 Id. at 2024 (emphasis added).  
93 Beery, supra note 9, at 131 (citing Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)). 
94 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723, 1725 (2018). 
95 See Beery, supra note 9, at 121 (citing Masterpiece Cakeshop, 137 S. Ct. at 
1729–31).  
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standing to challenge a neutral anti-discrimination law on free 
exercise grounds to begin with?  The law did not require the cake 
maker to undertake a religious exercise or to refrain from one any 
more than any civil rights law that governs the conduct of business 
people who do business with the public.  It was only because the 
cake maker’s religious sensibilities were in play that he could have 
had standing despite the lack of any discernible interference in 
religious activities or targeting of religious beliefs.  
Oddly enough, LGBT Americans do not always enjoy similar 
consideration when their secular sensibilities are offended.  In 
Barber v. Bryant, LGBT citizens challenged a Mississippi law that 
permitted discrimination against LGBT people on religious 
grounds.96  Under the law, the state was not permitted to take 
adverse action with regard to tax treatment, benefits, or 
employment when an individual acted in accordance with certain 
religious convictions in opposition to same-sex relationships and 
marriage.97  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
plaintiffs, who were “religious leaders who do not agree with the 
[beliefs protected by the Mississippi law], . . . gay and transgender 
persons who may be negatively affected by [the law], and . . . other 
persons . . . who do not share the . . . beliefs [protected under the 
law],”98 had failed to show any more than stigmatic harm, and 
therefore lacked standing.99 
So it seems that one’s angst is a concrete and palpable injury 
as long as it is religious angst and not secular angst.  This is why 
I have suggested elsewhere that advocates for secular causes 
should reframe their arguments in religious terms—that even 
atheism and agnosticism should be characterized as “beliefs  
about religion.”100  The Court in recent cases seems singularly 
unconcerned with beliefs around establishment and free exercise 
that are not religious in nature.101 
Burwell, Trinity Lutheran Church, and Masterpiece Cakeshop 
were decided when Justice Kennedy was still on the  
Supreme Court.  Justice Kennedy, although he often voted with 
conservatives on the Court on religious matters, did voice some 
 
96 860 F.3d 345, 350–51 (5th Cir. 2017). 
97 See id. at 350–52. 
98 Id. at 351. 
99 Id. at 353. 
100 See Beery, supra note 9, at 152–54 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736–37 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  
101 Id. 
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concern about the implications of the Court’s implicit conclusion 
that state neutrality was itself such an insult that it constitutes a 
free exercise injury: 
Justice Kennedy, although he concurred [in Trinity Lutheran 
Church], was discernably disquieted over the potential reach of 
the decision, claiming (hoping?) that the opinion “does not have 
the breadth and sweep ascribed to it by the respectful and 
powerful dissent,” and stating, as an aside, that free exercise 
means “the right to express . . . beliefs and to establish one’s 
religious (or nonreligious) self-definition in the political, civic, 
and economic life of our larger community.  But in a complex 
society and an era of pervasive governmental regulation, defining 
the proper realm for free exercise can be difficult.”102 
But Justice Kennedy has been replaced by Justice 
Kavanaugh, who seems to be a proponent of the prophylactic view 
of free exercise.  In Priests for Life v. U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit considered whether the ACA violated 
employers’ free exercise rights by requiring any employer wishing 
to opt out of the mandatory-contraceptive-care provision of the law 
to do so by filing a form.103  Then-Judge Kavanaugh dissented from 
an order denying to rehear the case en banc and noted that many 
religious adherents who were subject to the opt-out provision of 
the ACA “bitterly objected to this scheme” because it would 
“make[] them complicit in providing coverage for contraceptives, 
including some that they believe operate as abortifacients” and 
make the employers “complicit in the scheme” created by the 
ACA.104  
Then-Judge Kavanaugh wrote that “under Hobby Lobby, the 
regulations substantially burden the religious organizations’ 
exercise of religion because the regulations require the 
organizations to take an action contrary to their sincere religious 
beliefs (submitting the form) or else pay significant monetary 
penalties.”105  This rationale is the prophylactic approach to free 
exercise:  
 
102 Id. at 133 (quoting Burwell, 573 U.S. at 736–37 (2014) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)).  
103 See generally 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. 
Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam)).  
104 Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 808 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
105 Id. 
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[I]t is a substantial burden on the exercise of religion to cause a 
religious believer the pique of having to submit to a bureaucratic 
certification that would allow the believer to opt out of having to 
comply with a neutral and even-handed law that would, 
allegedly, entangle the believer in the areligious private choice of 
an employee to access contraceptives under an insurance policy 
written and administered by a third-party insurance carrier.106  
The Supreme Court’s new majority seems squarely of a mind 
to hold that in free exercise cases, unlike in establishment cases, 
a plaintiff—particularly if the plaintiff is Christian107—may plead 
a cognizable injury just by averring psychic insult, assuming that 
the psychic insult is grounded in religious dogmas.108  
The question arises why the Court, which more and more 
reflects conservative Christian orthodoxy in its membership,109 
sees state neutrality as to religion or mere compliance with neutral 
secular edicts in and of themselves ethereal and unremarkable 
components of participation in the social compact, as such grave 
injuries.   
 
106 Beery, supra note 9, at 134 (citation omitted).  
107 Islam, for example, has engendered little sympathy from the Supreme Court 
in its recent decisions. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408–09, 2418–19 (2018) 
(declining to place dispositive weight on anti-Muslim statements made by the 
President in public, and instead deferring to the judgment of President Donald J. 
Trump in barring entry into the United States of individuals from several 
predominantly Muslim nations); see also Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 661–62 (2019) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (vacating a stay of execution in the case of a Muslim prisoner 
who, unlike Christian prisoners in the Alabama prison system, was denied the 
presence of a spiritual advisor of his choice during his execution); see also Stewart, 
supra note 74 (“If your religion or deeply held moral beliefs include the view that all 
people should be treated with equal dignity, then this religious liberty won’t do 
anything for you. If you’re a taxpayer who helps to fund your local hospital, a patient 
who keeps it in business, or a professional who works there, then your sincerely held 
religious and moral conviction that all people are entitled to equal access to the  
best medicine that science can provide and the law permits won’t stand a chance 
against a Catholic bishop’s conviction that some procedures are forbidden by a  
higher authority.”). 
108 The new Supreme Court Justice also seems enamored with corporate 
religiosity: “Judge Kavanaugh’s record shows he also has a special place in his heart 
for the mystical belief systems of corporations. He endorsed the Hobby Lobby decision, 
which allowed that corporation to use its religious beliefs to deny birth control 
coverage to its employees.” Stewart, supra note 74. 
109 See Katie Kelaidis, How a Catholic Majority SCOTUS Fulfilled an Evangelical 
Dream, REWIRE.NEWS (July 23, 2018, 2:13 PM), https://rewire.news/religion-
dispatches/2018/07/23/how-a-catholic-majority-scotus-fulfilled-an-evangelical-dream 
(“[I]t seems hard to accept as coincidence that the current Court’s demographics began 
to take shape in the 1980s, a decade that marked the arrival of the religious right to 
the highest levels of political power.”). 
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III. INSULT AS INJURY 
Conservative Christians have long wanted to make their 
mark on the federal judiciary,110 and certainly they have 
succeeded.111  So to understand the Supreme Court majority’s 
views about religion and psychic insult as a concrete injury, one 
must understand the worldview and perspectives of religious 
conservatives more broadly.  
In the free exercise cases discussed above, federal judges 
found cognizable harm even in injuries that seemed to fall far 
short of the stigmatic harm alleged in Allen v. Wright.112  Being 
denied tire tar or having to file a form is a far cry from existing in 
a racially segregated school system or being tagged with a badge 
of inferiority—being made to feel an outsider, a “discrete and 
insular” minority set out of the body politic as the weak are culled 
from a herd.113  Stigmatic harm of the sort alleged in Allen at least 
combines psychic insult with the more palpable harm of class 
discrimination and maltreatment.  The injuries alleged in Burwell, 
Trinity Lutheran Church, Masterpiece Cake Shop, and Priests for 
Life did not even have that going for them; they involved psychic 
harm alone, decoupled from any claim of societal ostracization or 
degradation.  
 
 
110 See David A. Bosworth, American Crusade: The Religious Roots of the War on 
Terror, 7 BARRY L. REV. 65, 76–77 (Fall 2006) (citations omitted) (“While the 
Republican Party controlled two branches of the federal government, Christian 
nationalists turned their attention to the judiciary . . . pressur[ing] politicians to 
appoint their ideological allies to the judiciary . . . .”). 
111 See Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the Conservative Counterrevolution, 43  
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1698, 1698 (2018) (“The US conservative legal movement is 
flourishing. Conservatives and libertarians exercise considerable influence on law and 
policy through an infrastructure of organizations, lawyers, and financial patrons. 
They have developed a deep bench of highly credentialed lawyers who hold prominent 
positions in law firms, advocacy organizations, think tanks, universities, and 
government. Republican administrations have drawn on that pool to make judicial 
appointments, which has significantly improved conservatives’ prospects for success 
in the courts.”); see also Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Michael Cohen’s 
Testimony Opens New Phase of Political Turbulence for Trump, N.Y. TIMES  
(Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/us/politics/michael-cohen-trump-
reelection.html (“Ralph Reed, a longtime evangelical leader, said Mr. Trump’s record 
of delivering on conservative priorities had effectively cemented his own party in 
place, fostering particular loyalty among Christian conservatives with two Supreme 
Court appointments and efforts to restrict abortion rights. ‘He made a set of promises 
and he not only kept them — he is in many cases exceeding them,’ Mr. Reed said.”). 
112 468 U.S. 737, 755–56 (1984).  
113 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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A. The Nature of Evangelism and the Non-Believer as 
Accessorial 
But alas, there are reasons why religious conservatives see 
secular neutrality and their own loss of control as more serious 
injuries than even the stigmatic harm attendant to racial 
discrimination.  First, it is in the nature of evangelism to pit the 
believer as the central figure in a biblically sanctioned design, and 
to cast non-believers as instrumentalities necessary to the 
evangelical project to proselytize and convert.114  In this sense, 
non-believers are accessorial in nature.  This paradigm engenders 
the perception of loss of centrality as an acute injury.115  Second, 
there is the harm inhering in the loss of power when a group that 
once enjoyed dominant cultural influence is met, rather than with 
obedience, instead with cruel indifference.116  Finally, it is in the 
nature of fundamentalist Christians to see their own persecution 
as a necessary component of the life of a believer, and Christian 
conservatives are therefore predisposed to see resistance or 
rejection of their dogmas as persecution—as a concrete and 
palpable injury.117  These factors combine to incite claims of injury 
that are forlorn and even overwrought.   
1. Evangelism Requires the Participation of Non-Adherents 
The notion of secular neutrality—what might be defined as 
the non-participation of non-adherents in the religious projects of 
Christian conservatives—as a free exercise injury likely has to do 
with the nature of evangelism and the missionary calling of many 
Christians.   
From the birth of the religion, Christians have been spreading 
their faith. . . . The “Great Commission” of Jesus lays the 
groundwork for Christian missions:  “Go therefore and make 
disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father 
and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit and teaching them to obey 
everything that I have commanded you.”118   
 
 
114 See infra Section III.A.1 and accompanying notes. 
115 See infra Section III.A.2 and accompanying notes.  
116 See infra Section III.B and accompanying notes. 
117 See infra Section III.C and accompanying notes. 
118 Joel A. Nichols, Mission, Evangelism, and Proselytism in Christianity: 
Mainline Conceptions as Reflected in Church Documents, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 563, 
563 (1998) (quoting Matthew 28:19–20 (NRSV)).  
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The religious impulse to abide by this command has had some 
unfortunate historical outcomes, as the conversion of unbelievers 
has not always been achieved through peaceable persuasion.119   
In modern American culture, evangelical outreach rarely 
approximates the violent misadventures of much of Christian lore, 
but there remains an element of aggression.120  “Since Christianity 
is, by its nature, a missionary faith, Christians claim the right to 
attempt to persuade others of the truth of their faith.  Of course, 
the right to attempt to convince people to change their religious 
beliefs stands in tension with the other party’s right to privacy.”121  
John Fea, a historian at Messiah College,122 described modern 
evangelism this way:  “Evangelicals are primarily concerned with 
preaching the gospel, with evangelism, with social justice 
ministries . . . . So . . . they’re out trying to win people to Christ.”123  
In this sense, modern conservative American Christianity differs 
from some other sects and religious movements throughout 
history.  Jewish people, for example, have generally “had no wish 
to convert the Gentiles; they were content with the feeling . . . they 
derived from being the Chosen People.”124  As another example, 
“Shinto, which teaches that Japan was created earlier than the 
rest of the world, is not intended or likely to appeal to those who 
are not Japanese.”125 
 
119 See id. at 565 (citations omitted) (“Unhappily, theological justification has been 
offered for the use of force since the time of St. Augustine. Using Jesus’ parable of a 
great feast, Augustine interpreted the words “compelle intrare” (compel them to come 
in) as applicable to those who believed something other than orthodox doctrine: the 
heretics. Augustine’s interpretation gave theological justification to all manner of 
pressure and persecution of the heterodox over the centuries.”). 
120 See Isabelle R. Gunning, Lawyers of All Faiths: Constructing Professional 
Identity and Finding Common Ground, 39 J. LEGAL PROF. 231, 271 (2015) (“[L]awyers 
who identified with proselytizing forms of Christianity stated that [in their 
professional lives] they practiced ‘lifestyle evangelism’ rather than an ‘aggressive 
evangelism’ that could conflict with client autonomy.”); Susan J. Stabile, What is 
Religious “Persecution” in a Pluralist Society?, 59 VILL. L. REV. 753, 762 (2014) 
(“Different Christian traditions have different ideas about what evangelization 
means. And some Christians are fairly aggressive in their efforts to try to bring other 
people to the Christian faith.”). 
121 Nichols, supra note 118, at 565 (citation omitted). 
122 MESSIAH COLLEGE, https://www.messiah.edu/a/academics/facultydir/faculty_ 
profile.php?directoryID=9&entryID=453 (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).  
123 Sarah McCammon & Domenico Montanaro, Religion, the Supreme Court and 
Why It Matters, NPR (July 7, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/07/626711777/ 
religion-the-supreme-court-and-why-it-matters (quoting John Fea). 
124 BERTRAND RUSSELL, POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS 141 (2004).  
125 Id. at 141–42.  
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On the other hand, in the evangelical view, although it is 
advisable for an adherent to engage in humanitarian outreach and 
also to live life in a way that exemplifies biblical moral teachings, 
it is even more important that the adherents evangelize by 
proclaiming their beliefs.126  
This summary elucidates a remarkable view of rights as they 
relate to evangelical Christian free exercise.  Since the very nature 
of evangelical Christianity is that exercising one’s religion involves 
the participation of non-believers as would-be proselytes, a 
non-believer may obstruct an evangelical Christian individual’s 
religious calling simply by refusing to participate or at least to be 
available.  In a paradigm where the believer cannot be the 
principal without accessories, accessories must exist and accede; 
failure to provide accessorial participation in believers’ project to 
proselytize and convert is, in a sense, a denial of free exercise. 
Evangelical Protestants127 are not alone in this way of 
thinking; Catholicism involves similar values: 
The foundation for modern Roman Catholic missiology was laid 
by the Second Vatican Council [which reaffirmed] . . . that “the 
Church on earth is by its very nature missionary.” . . .  
 
 
126 Joel A. Nichols, Evangelicals and Human Rights: The Continuing Ambivalence 
of Evangelical Christians’ Support for Human Rights, 24 J. L. & RELIGION 629,  
635–36 (2008–2009) (citation omitted) ( “[S]ocial action (through assisting those in 
need) and ‘“witness’” (living a godly life or by practicing the Eucharist regularly) are 
not evangelism. These latter actions are desirable, but rank lower in priority for 
evangelicals.”). 
127 David M. Smolin, Religion, Education, and the Theoretically Liberal State: 
Contrasting Evangelical and Secularist Perspectives, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 99,  
99–100 (2005). Professor Smolin states: 
For purposes of this essay, I would define evangelical Protestantism as 
involving the following: 
(1) Adherence to classic Christian orthodoxy, and hence to monotheistic 
Trinitarian theology, as reflected in ancient creedal statements such as the 
Apostle’s and Nicene Creed. 
(2) Acceptance of the Protestant Old Testament and New Testament canon 
as inspired scripture and the preeminent source of religious authority, with 
such scripture regarded as reliable and true (i.e. infallible/inerrant). 
(3) An emphasis on a personal relationship between each individual believer 
and God, expressed as a relationship of trust and faith in Christ, which 
involves the individual turning away from sin and toward God (personal 
repentance). 
(4) An emphasis on “evangelism,” based on a Biblical mandate to spread the 
Christian faith to persons of every national, ethnic, and cultural group. Thus, 
evangelicals believe that the Christian faith represents universal truth and 
the way of salvation applicable in every culture. 
Id. 
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Christ proclaimed his own mission by claiming, “The Spirit of the 
Lord is upon me, because he anointed me; to bring good news to 
the poor he sent me, to heal the broken-hearted, to proclaim to 
the captive release, and sight to the blind.”  On another occasion 
Christ claimed, “The Son of man has come to seek and to save 
what was lost.”  The Church, as the Body of Christ, has assumed 
Christ’s missionizing nature and task. . . . [M]ost importantly, 
the missionary nature of the Church stems from the activity of 
the Holy Spirit.  The Holy Spirit is the true agent of mission, and 
that agent is active in and through the Church.  Claiming the 
Holy Spirit allows the Church to designate its activities as 
God-ordained. 
 
The Church is obligated to “proclaim the faith and salvation 
which comes from Christ” because Christ commanded his 
apostles (and thus the Church) to go into all nations and make 
disciples.  The Church carries out its mission to all the nations as 
it obediently “makes itself fully present to all men and peoples in 
order to lead them to the faith, freedom and peace of Christ by 
the example of its life and teaching, by the sacraments and other 
means of grace.”  The purpose of missionary activity is to “make 
Christ present” to those people being evangelized, so that they 
may know the mystery and love of Christ.128 
“[G]o into all nations and make disciples.”129  Again, the very 
nature of one’s religion may be that it requires others as 
accessorial participants in the project.  If a believer comes to me 
and wishes to heal me, to proclaim to me his beliefs, and to make 
of me a proselyte, and if I do not allow him at least to try, then in 
a very real sense, I am denying him the ability—the “right”—to 
practice and perform his religious mission: to exercise his religion.  
The centrality principle manifested in this arrangement—the 
believer as central and all others as accessorial—is a common 
theme among organized religions on a more macro scale, as well.  
Geocentrism, until Copernicus came along, reflected humans’ 
collective narcissism in the assumption that all the universe must 
revolve around us: 
 
128 Nichols, supra note 118, at 570–71 (first quoting Luke 4:8; then quoting Luke 
9:10; and then quoting Decree of the Church’s Missionary Activity reprinted in 
MISSIONS AND RELIGIONS 82–120 ¶¶ 5, 9, 20 (Austin Flannery, OP, ed., Redmond 
Fitzmaurice, OP, trans., 1968)). 
129 Id. at 571 (quoting Decree of the Church’s Missionary Activity reprinted in 
MISSIONS AND RELIGIONS 82–120 ¶ 5 (Austin Flannery, OP, ed., Redmond 
Fitzmaurice, OP, trans., 1968)). 
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The first [developmental] revolution [preceding the information 
age] is the assertion of heliocentrism by Nikolas Copernicus 
(1473–1543), which decentered human self-understanding being 
the apex at the center of God’s creation by arguing that the sun, 
rather than the earth, was at the center of the universe.  [The] 
second and third revolutions occurred in the late nineteenth 
century[.  T]he second was Charles Darwin’s Origins of Species, 
and the third was . . . the development of Sigmund Freud’s 
psychoanalysis.  Darwin decentered human beings from the apex 
position among animals by showing that animals, including 
humans, evolve through historical processes and have common 
origins.  He showed that human uniqueness does not lay in the 
creative source of the species since all species evolve through a 
common set of physical processes and the species were less 
differentiated in earlier generations.  Human beings can no 
longer claim to possess a metaphysical essence superior to other 
creatures.  While traits, like being rational, might still 
distinguish humans from non-humans, rationality itself is not 
part of the metaphysical substance of the person as viewed in pre-
modern thought.  Freud discovered the unconscious mind and its 
influence on reason.  This discovery altered philosophical 
anthropology again, this time decentering human beings from 
the privileged position of being the only self-aware beings.  After 
the discovery of the unconscious mind, it was no longer possible 
to maintain the belief that human beings know themselves and 
consciously control their own actions.130 
The Church’s view of geocentrism was sufficiently dogmatic 
and foundational that it called one of history’s most esteemed 
thinkers, Galileo, before the Inquisition, requiring him to 
renounce his own claims of heliocentrism and spend the rest of his 
days under house arrest.131  The rebellion of dogmatists—mostly 
religious—to the ideas of evolution and the “decentering” of 
humankind from the core of all existence is well documented:132  
 
130 Kevin P. Lee, A Preface to the Philosophy of Legal Information, 20 SMU SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 277, 282–83 (2017) (citing LUCIANO FLORIDI, INFORMATION: A VERY 
SHORT INTRODUCTION ix, 8–9; Boethius, A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorias, 
in THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES 73–127 (E. Capps et al eds., 2005); DANIEL 
DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF  
LIFE (1995)).  
131 See Nathaniel T. Noda, Perpetuating Cultures: What Fan-Based Activities Can 
Teach Us About Intangible Cultural Property, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 429, 450 (2011).  
132 See Susan Haack, Cracks in the Wall, a Bulge Under the Carpet: The Singular 
Story of Religion, Evolution, and the U.S. Constitution, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1303, 1312 
(2011) (citations omitted) (“When the Origin was published, there was a storm of 
religious protest: the Bishop of Oxford, ‘Soapy Sam’ Wilberforce, accused Darwin of ‘a 
tendency to limit the glory of God in creation,’ declaring that his theory ‘contradict[ed] 
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“[Religion] assures [people] that god cares for them individually, 
and it claims that the cosmos was created with them specifically 
in mind.”133   
A claim of entitlement to centrality in our society and culture 
is a claim of privilege, not merely a claim to the right to exist 
peacefully and be let alone.134  So in the conservative Christian 
worldview, the mere governmental tolerance of religion will not do; 
author and journalist Katherine Stewart recently argued that  
[i]f the Senate confirms Brett Kavanaugh, it will be declaring 
that the United States is a nation in which one brand of religion 
enjoys a place of privilege; [and] that we are a nation of laws—
except [when] the law offends those who subscribe to our 
preferred religion . . . .135 
2. Principal and Accessory 
In an article published in 2002, Professor Richard Hiers, in 
comments seemingly critical of individualism, wrote: 
[Professor] Susan Wolfson’s comments on the problematics of 
rights theory based on individualism could be applied to all 
jurisprudential systems founded on individual self-interest: 
“[B]y having the exclusive focus of the model on the 
individual and his autonomous initiative in exercising his 
rights, a blindly inaccurate and immoral egocentricity of the 
individual is actually a central component of the model 
itself . . . . Each individual’s autonomy becomes a virtual law 
unto itself unaccountable to anyone else, except in so far as 
[ . . . ] in or out of court with the other individual’s conduct.”  
 
the revealed relations of creation to its Creator’; philosopher of science William 
Whewell refused to allow the book in the library at Trinity College, Cambridge. When 
The Descent of Man was published, Pope Pius IX denounced it as ‘a 
system . . . repugnant at once to history, to the tradition of all peoples, to exact science, 
to observed facts, and even to Reason itself.’ ” (first quoting 1 ANDREW DICKSON 
WHITE, A HISTORY OF THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY IN CHRISTENDOM 
70 (Dover ed., 1960) (1896); then quoting DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: 
THE CASE FOR EVOLUTION 24 (Pantheon Books, 1st ed. 1983))). 
133 CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS 
EVERYTHING 74 (2007).  
134 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable 
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, 
of his feelings, and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure 
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They 
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.”).  
135 Stewart, supra note 74.  
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The self may, of course, be regarded as the center of value, and a 
person may be committed to the advancement of his or her own 
interests.  In that case, however, one is concerned for others only 
incidentally or instrumentally, to the extent that what is good for 
the other is also good for oneself.136 
In this passage, Professor Hiers seems to suggest that 
individual autonomy is unsatisfactory in its unconcern for the 
wellbeing of others.  But this arguably misconceives the idea  
of individual autonomy.  An autonomous individual is not 
necessarily unconcerned with the wellbeing of others; he is simply 
unwilling to play an accessorial role in somebody else’s story.  
Autonomy may be responsive to the claim of others of entitlement 
to centrality; it is not necessarily a manifestation of narcissistic or 
hedonistic impulses in and of itself.  Is it a free spirit on the 
periphery of society who is most likely to see others as 
instrumentalities or props?  Or is it, rather, the person or group 
that claims centrality and insists that all others remain in orbit 
around the dogmas and missions of the self or the ingroup?  
To some, freedom and liberty mean freedom to proselytize and 
participate in others’ behavior; autonomy and choice are regarded 
as contrary to notions of justice.  For example, Michael Gerson, an 
evangelical Christian and one-time adviser in the George W. Bush 
administration, had this to say about the Democratic Party and its 
liberal preferences: 
I would love to see the Democratic Party return to a tradition of 
social justice that was found in people like William Jennings 
Bryan.  During that period, many if not most politically engaged 
evangelicals were in the Democratic Party, because it was a party 
oriented toward justice.  I don’t see much of that now in the 
Democratic Party.  Instead of an emphasis on the weak and 
suffering, there’s so much emphasis on autonomy and choice.137 
Here, Gershen advances the proposition not just that a preference 
for autonomy and choice is a bad thing, but also that autonomy 
and choice run counter to social justice and the interests of the 
 
136 Richard H. Hiers, Biblical Social Welfare Legislation: Protected Classes and 
Provisions for Persons in Need, 17 J. L. & RELIGION 49, 93 (2002) (quoting Susan A. 
Wolfson, Modern Liberal Rights Theory and Jewish Law, 9 J. L. & RELIG. 399,  
410–11 (1992)). 
137 Robert J. Delahunty, Changing Hearts, Changing Minds: A New Evangelical 
Politics?, 47 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 271, 273–74 (2008) (citing Collin Hansen, How 
Then Shall We Politick? Michael Gerson, Recently Resigned Bush Speechwriter and 
Adviser, on How Evangleicals Should Comport Themselves in the Public Square, 
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 2006, at 40 (interviewing Michael Gerson)). 
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weak and suffering.  At the very least, the suggestion is that 
autonomy and choice rank lower than social justice, and that they 
cannot, therefore, be components of social justice. 
From an evangelical standpoint, this makes sense:  If the 
central mission of one’s life—one’s calling—is to corral, channel, 
and correct human behavior, then liberty is not found in one’s 
autonomy to make one’s own choices, but rather in freedom to 
proselytize—and to prevent the sinking of fellow travelers into the 
currents of hedonism—or at least to try.  The non-adherent’s role 
is to acquiesce to evangelism.  And if the believer’s most sacrosanct 
calling is in proclamation and intercession—be it passive or 
aggressive—then surely the government’s obstruction of that 
calling is a burden on free exercise, and a concrete and palpable 
injury.  Put simply, proclamation requires a receptive audience—
receptive at least to hearing, if not to accepting.  If my central 
religious mission is to proclaim my beliefs to others, then others 
must make themselves available, and their failure to make 
themselves available, or the government’s getting between me and 
them, leaves me whistling into the wind, unable to perform my 
religion and undertake my most essential religious practices.  
B. Loss of Power and Control 
An obviously related problem for a person or group that has 
suffered extra-centric injury is the loss of power and control.  To 
understand how the loss of power by a religious group or person 
can be a concrete and palpable injury, one must rid oneself of the 
popular conception of piety as subservience rather than 
dominance.  As Bertrand Russell opined: 
The power impulse has two forms: explicit, in leaders; and 
implicit, in their followers.  When men willingly follow a leader, 
they do so with a view to the acquisition of power by the group 
which he commands, and they feel that his triumphs are theirs.  
Most men do not feel in themselves the competence required for 
leading their group to victory, and therefore seek out a captain 
who appears to possess the courage and sagacity necessary for 
the achievement of supremacy.  Even in religion this impulse 
appears.  Nietzsche accused Christianity of inculcating a 
slave-morality, but ultimate triumph was always the goal. 
‘Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.’ Or as a 
well-known hymn more explicitly states it: 
The Son of God goes forth to war, 
A kingly crown to gain. 
His blood-red banner streams afar. 
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Who follows in His train? 
Who best can drink his cup of woe, 
Triumphant over pain, 
Who patient bears his cross below, 
He follows in His train.138 
If the impulse to acquire power is so innate to the human 
endeavor, then losing power after it has been acquired must seem 
an acute injury.  Indeed, in The Federalist No. 71, Alexander 
Hamilton wrote: 
It is a general principle of human nature that a man will be 
interested in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness 
or precariousness of the tenure by which he holds it; will be less 
attached to what he holds by a momentary or uncertain title, 
than to what he enjoys by a durable or certain title; and, of 
course, will be willing to risk more for the sake of the one than 
for the sake of the other.139 
About this observation, Professor John Wood explains: 
This “general principle” combines an understanding of the 
endowment effect, loss aversion, and prospect theory, 
respectively.  People value what they already possess more than 
what they do not (endowment effect).  People prefer avoiding loss 
to acquiring gains (loss aversion).  People evaluate outcomes 
based on the change that outcome represents from an initial 
reference point rather than based on the nature of the outcome 
itself (prospect theory).  So much was said [by Hamilton] without 
reference to a single replicable, empirical study.140 
“The endowment effect is the phenomenon whereby people value 
something more when they own it than when they do not own it.”141  
The effect increases with time.142  It cannot be gainsaid that 
conservative Christians, throughout American history, have 
“owned” a position of dominance in politics and culture.143  
Interestingly, “the endowment effect will increase with the 
evolutionary salience of the item in question. . . . ‘[E]volutionary  
 
 
 
138 RUSSELL, supra note 124, at 7–8. 
139 THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton). 
140 John Wood, The “Constitution of Man”: Reflections on Human Nature from The 
Federalist Papers to Behavioral Law and Economics, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 184, 
207 (2013). 
141 Justin L. Bernstein, Controlling Medicare with Lessons from Endowment 
Effect Experiments, 49 CAL. W. L. REV. 169, 170 (2013). 
142 Id. at 177. 
143 See JONES, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
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salience’ . . . is the connection an organism perceives between its 
survival and [an] item.  Thus, food has more evolutionary salience 
than toys.”144 
“Aversion to losses is one of the most robust phenomena in the 
pantheon of decision theory . . . .  It even has a neurological 
basis.”145  
Loss aversion . . . , as psychologists dubbed this 
phenomenon, . . .  [posits] that preferences . . . depend upon the 
position people currently occupy (reference-dependent choice).  It 
also leads to a preference for the status quo . . . .  Loss aversion 
induces people to value commodities more once they own 
them . . . , [and] when [facing] . . . losses, an aversion to sure 
losses leads to risk-seeking conduct; people choose options that 
hold out hope of losing as little as possible, even when those 
options are economically less attractive than [other] 
options . . . .146   
If the psychological tendency to hold on to what one has is powerful 
enough to warrant risk-seeking behaviors as an alternative, then 
it would seem that the prospect of losing the status quo, 
particularly for individuals or groups possessed of long-term power 
and dominance, might induce anxieties that seem, psychologically, 
palpable and intense.147  
The dominance of Judeo-Christian norms prevailed for so 
much of the nation’s modern history that it has become a reference 
point against which to judge historical and cultural 
developments.148  What might seem to a secularist or a merely 
 
144 Bernstein, supra note 141, at 176. 
145 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Gains, Losses, and Judges: 
Framing and the Judiciary, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 521, 523 (2018). 
146 Id. at 524–25. 
147 For a good discussion of how these principles and “prospect theory” apply to 
economic decision-making, see Aurora Harley, Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion: 
How Users Make Decisions, NIELSEN NORMAN GROUP (June 19, 2016), 
https://www.nngroup.com/articles/prospect-theory/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
148 See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: 
Judeo-Christianity and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 281–82 
(2007) (“Waves of European immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries exposed ‘nonsectarian’ Christianity as essentially Protestant. This period is 
accordingly marked by periodic Catholic and Jewish resistance to assimilation by 
‘nonsectarian’ Christian culture, especially in the public schools. By the 1950s, 
however, these conflicts had largely abated. Succeeding generations of Catholic and 
Jewish immigrants had absorbed some of the Protestant individualism implicit in 
‘nonsectarianism,’ while nonsectarianism itself loosened its ties to Protestant beliefs 
and observances. This permitted a reformulation of the American civil religion  
from ‘nonsectarian’ Christianity to a more plausible transdenominational 
‘Judeo-Christianity.’ Thus did Justice Douglas declare in the early 1950s that 
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indifferent citizen to be nothing more than benign historical 
evolution as the United States moves away from conservative 
Christian moorings must seem to some conservative Christians an 
acute trigger of loss aversion with respect to the societal and 
cultural largesse with which they have for so long been endowed.  
C. Persecution 
The upshot of all this is a claim of persecution, and 
persecution is something that a conservative Christian believer 
should welcome even while decrying its injustice.  It seems fair to 
say that if conservative Christians do not feel persecuted, then 
they must not be doing religion the right way—because the Bible 
teaches that believers, if they are doing it right, can expect to be 
persecuted.149  Among the Bible verses discussing the inevitability 
of persecution to Christians who do Christ’s will are the following: 
• “Indeed, all who desire to live a godly life in Christ Jesus 
will be persecuted . . . .”150  
• “Beloved, do not be surprised at the fiery trial when it comes 
upon you to test you, as though something strange were 
happening to you.  But rejoice insofar as you share Christ’s 
sufferings, that you may also rejoice and be glad when his 
glory is revealed.  If you are insulted for the name of Christ, 
you are blessed, because the Spirit of glory and of God rests 
upon you.”151 
• “Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ 
sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.”152 
• “Blessed are you when others revile you and persecute  
you and utter all kinds of evil against you falsely on  
my account.”153 
• “If the world hates you, know that it has hated me before it 
hated you.  If you were of the world, the world would love 
you as its own; but because you are not of the world, but I 
chose you out of the world, therefore the world hates you.  
 
Americans are a ‘religious’ rather than a ‘Christian’ people, and that American 
institutions presuppose belief in a ‘Supreme Being,’ which presumably signified the 
Jewish as well as the Christian God.” (citations omitted)). 
149 See generally Stephen Smith (ed.), 100 Bible Verses about Persecution, 
OPENBIBLE.INFO, https://www.openbible.info/topics/persecution (last visited Oct.  
12, 2019). 
150 Id. (quoting 2 Timothy 3:12 (English Standard Version)). 
151 Id. (quoting 1 Peter 4:12–14). 
152 Id. (quoting Matthew 5:10).  
153 Id. (quoting Matthew 5:11). 
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Remember the word that I said to you:  ‘A servant is not 
greater than his master.’  If they persecuted me, they will 
also persecute you.  If they kept my word, they will also 
keep yours.”154 
The natural tendency, then, would be to see persecution, 
which in a sense is a welcome marker of piety and faith, as present 
wherever it is even arguably in play: 
Any number of issues have given rise to the use by various 
persons of the label “persecution” to describe the treatment of 
Catholic or other Christians in this country: 
• The Health and Human Services mandate that 
employers (including Catholic universities and hospitals) 
provide contraceptive coverage for their employees, 
which the outgoing president of the Ethics and Religious 
Liberty Commission characterized as “by definition, a 
form of religious persecution.” 
• The lack of satisfactory religious exemptions in state 
statutes governing same-sex marriage as well as lawsuits 
against companies who refuse to provide services to gay 
couples. 
• Laws that seek to force Catholic adoption and foster care 
agencies to allow gays to adopt children (or punish those 
who do not). 
• Restrictions on evangelization in the military. . . . 
• Not being able to put Christian symbols on public 
buildings, such as the Ten Commandments on school 
buildings.155 
And as Professor Susan J. Stabile also notes: 
Once people see themselves as “persecuted,” their instinctive 
reaction is to fight and resist.  And the fight becomes fierce 
because a kind of circle the wagon mentality arises and anyone 
outside that circle is the enemy.  And when we are talking in 
religious terms, the enemy is evil.  If I believe I am persecuted, I 
must fight to defend myself.  It is not just that someone disagrees 
with me[;] I am being attacked.156 
In a similar vein, “Where a spirit of ferocious dogmatism 
prevails, any opinion with which men disagree is liable to provoke 
a breach of the peace.  Schoolboys are apt to ill-treat a boy whose 
opinions are in any way odd, and many grown men have not got 
 
154 Id. (quoting John 15:18–20).  
155 Stabile, supra note 120, at 754–55 (citation omitted). 
156 Id. at 765. 
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beyond the mental age of schoolboys.”157  This is especially so with 
regard to “beliefs . . . instilled into the minds of the young . . . . The 
beliefs are instilled, not by giving any reason for supposing them 
true, but by . . . repetition . . . and mass suggestion.”158 Once 
dogmatic beliefs are instilled, and when it turns out that 
competing creeds have been instilled in different populations, 
these creeds “produce two armies which clash, not two parties that 
can discuss.  Each . . . feels that everything most sacred is bound 
up with the victory of his side, [and that] everything most horrible 
is exemplified by the other side.”159  So there is no soft landing for 
the losing side in a battle between creeds, particularly where one 
or both is grounded in the repetition of rote dogmas; there is, 
rather, total loss—a psychic injury as grave as it is invisible  
and ethereal.  
Once again, we see indicia of acute injury—attack—even in 
the insult of mere neutrality or in the refusal to allow conservative 
Christians to intervene in the lives of others.  And as mentioned 
earlier, claims of persecution and injury can seem forlorn and 
overwrought.  One scholar has likened the rhetoric of religious 
conservatives in the “Culture Wars” to conservative rhetoric on the 
“War on Terror.”160  As she explains, “[t]he commonalities between 
emergency rhetoric in the War on Terror and in the Culture Wars 
are indisputable.  In both cases, conservatives have framed 
historical events (small or large) in terms of injury, enmity, crisis, 
and emergency.”161  As Professor Stabile notes, these despairing 
claims of persecution and injury emerge even when religious 
conservatives are merely restrained from interceding in the lives 
and belief systems of others, as when they are asked to refrain 
from evangelizing in the military, or to abide by 
anti-discrimination laws that protect LGBT Americans, or to 
provide insurance coverage to employees that makes it employees’ 
choice rather than employers’ choice whether to access and use 
contraceptives for sexual or health purposes.162 
 
 
157 RUSSELL, supra note 124, at 241–42.  
158 Id. at 245. 
159 Id. 
160 See Noa Ben-Asher, Faith-Based Emergency Powers, 41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
269, 270 (2018). 
161 Id. at 281 (emphasis added).  
162 Stabile, supra note 120, at 754–55. 
616	 ST.	JOHN’S	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	93:579			
To the last example, if I am a believer whose dogmas were 
once central and whose deeply held beliefs require my intercession 
in the lives of others, then I need not be compelled to directly 
provide contraceptives to others to suffer a free exercise injury; it 
is, rather, an affront to my religious freedom even that I must 
allow the use of contraceptives by those in my employ.163  My 
freedom to do what?  To not allow it—not among my employees 
and not in my sphere of conscious awareness.  And if the 
government permits me to opt out of the program only by filing a 
form, the government has coerced me into actively releasing others 
from obedience to my will.164  By opting out of participating in their 
sin, I am forced to abide it—when my belief system requires me 
not just to exist in peace as to my own life, but also to stop the sins 
of others, or at least to try.  This is the nature of evangelism and 
proselytizing:  I cannot achieve my own salvation without the 
involvement of others, and to be free to practice my religion, I must 
therefore be free to involve myself in the lives of others, or at least 
not to participate in their emancipation from the strictures of my 
beliefs.165  In this view of things, the government’s refusal to allow 
me to manage the contraceptive choices of my employees will have 
caused me great anxiety and angst—indeed to fear for the fate of 
my soul in its eternal fate.  And surely, that is the greatest injury 
imaginable. 
So under the conservative religious worldview, generally 
applicable and neutral laws, when they require adherents to 
traditional religious beliefs to accede to secular policy outcomes 
that offend sectarian sensibilities, are, in a sense, discriminatory.  
A natural corollary to this view is the notion that the government’s 
active promotion of religion merely constitutes non-discrimination 
or anti-discrimination: 
[F]aith-based programs formally adopt the language of 
anti-discrimination.  The concept begins with the premise that 
religious groups historically have been excluded from 
government benefits, which amounts to anti-religious 
discrimination.  To avoid or eliminate this discrimination, there 
 
163 See generally, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
164 See generally Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 772 
F.3d 229, (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)  
(per curiam)). 
165 This may explain why “[w]hile most white mainline Protestants supported the 
court ruling [regarding the right of same-sex couples to marry], as did majorities of 
Catholics and Jews, white evangelical Protestants remain strongly opposed.” JONES, 
supra note 1, at 43. 
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must be a government initiative to ensure that religious groups 
are restored to a position of equality with their non-religious 
peers.  This is essentially a variation on the rhetoric of 
affirmative action, applied to secure religious benefits from 
government spending programs.  While this reasoning might 
have merit in circumstances where past discrimination unrelated 
to legitimate principles separating church and state can be 
demonstrated, it is complicated both by the commands of the 
Establishment Cause [sic] and by the inherent potential for 
claims of anti-discrimination to cloak motives of religious 
preference.166 
So it is not just that the government must allow evangelicals 
to proselytize or to involve themselves in the contraceptive choices 
of the employees in their charge.  The government must also give 
money for tire tar to churches, because any effort to disentangle 
the government from religion—in other words, governmental 
neutrality as to religion—is, in this view, in fact discriminatory.  
Put simply, conservative Christians consider themselves 
entitled to the centrality of their purposes and missions in 
American life, and they see their emerging extra-centrality as an 
acute injury that, even if merely psychic in nature, is also concrete 
and palpable. 
IV. PROPHYLACTIC FREE EXERCISE REQUIRES INSULT AS INJURY  
Some lower courts have applied a standing test in free exercise 
cases that reflects the dynamic—rather than the prophylactic view 
of the Free Exercise Clause—that fails to account for the forces 
that undergird the conservative Christian conception of injury.  
Consider a recent case from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Nikolao v. Lyon.167  Under Michigan law, children must be 
vaccinated before entering public school.168  In Nikolao, the 
plaintiff, a mother, objected on religious grounds to having her 
children vaccinated.169  Michigan allowed the plaintiff to get a 
waiver, but she first had to meet with a local health official and 
explain the reason for her objection.170  Two health department 
nurses failed to convince the mother to have her children 
vaccinated.171  After getting the waiver, she sued, claiming that the 
 
166 Rahdert, supra note 54, at 1012–13 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).  
167 875 F.3d 310 (6th Cir. 2017).  
168 Id. at 314. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
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exemption process—called the Certification Rule172—ran afoul of 
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.173  Before 
turning to the merits of the parent’s constitutional claims, the 
court addressed whether she had standing to sue. 
As discussed briefly above, to have Article III standing to sue, 
a plaintiff must show that:  (1) she has suffered an injury-in-fact, 
(2) the injury was caused by the defendant, and (3) the injury is 
redressable by a court.174  Under Sixth Circuit precedent, standing 
to assert a free exercise claim is grounded in coercion.175  This 
approach is consistent with the idea of dynamic free exercise—the 
idea that the exercise of religion involves the performance or 
practice of religious rites or rituals or the overt expression of 
religious belief.  Thus, “a litigant suffers an injury to her free 
exercise rights when the state compels her ‘to do or refrain from 
doing an act forbidden or required by [her] religion, or to affirm or 
disavow a belief forbidden or required by [her] religion.’ ”176 
As part of the exemption process, the plaintiff in Nikolao was 
exposed to information she disagreed with in the form of a 
Religious Waiver Note.177  The Religious Waiver Note was a list of 
responses to common religion-based objections to vaccines.178  But 
according to the court, the plaintiff gave “no indication that the 
information coerced her into doing or not doing anything.”179  None 
of the information the government gave the plaintiff forced her to 
change her religious beliefs.180  And she had “not presented any 
facts to suggest that the state ha[d] coerced her in her religious 
practices.  As such, she ha[d] not suffered an injury-in-fact under 
the Free Exercise Clause and [did] not have standing to pursue 
that claim.”181 The court went so far as to say that: 
Having to take time off from work to travel to and from the local 
health office is not a sufficient injury for standing purposes 
either.  This requirement does [not] burden her practice of 
 
172 Id. at 314–15. The “Certification Rule” is an administrative rule created by the 
Michigan Department of Health and Human Services that spells out the exemption 
process. See id. at 314. 
173 Id. at 315. 
174 Id. at 315–16. 
175 Id. at 316. 
176 Id. (quoting Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1066 (6th  
Cir. 1987)). 
177 Id. at 314. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 316. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
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religion [or] discriminate against religion in any way, as all 
parents seeking nonmedical exemptions must go through the 
same process.182 
In stating that the Sixth Circuit requires coercion for free 
exercise standing, the court cited Mozert v. Hawkins County Board 
of Education, in which the Sixth Circuit held that a student’s 
parents had failed to present a cognizable free exercise violation 
because there was no evidence that the defendant school district 
“required [the student] to profess or deny a religious belief.”183 
In some senses, the court’s reliance on the coercion test in a 
religion-in-public-school case to assess standing in a free exercise 
case seems misplaced.  First, the coercion test is normally applied 
in Establishment Clause cases to determine whether the 
government has impermissibly promoted religion, not in Free 
Exercise Clause cases to determine whether the government has 
interfered with someone’s religious practices.184  Second, whereas 
standing is a justiciability issue that normally precedes any 
discussion of the merits of a case, the coercion test is normally 
considered when a court is addressing the merits of a First 
Amendment religion claim.185 
But this is not to say that the Nikolao court’s reference to 
coercion does not make sense.  In fact, it makes eminent sense.  
For one thing, the distinction between addressing a party’s 
standing and addressing the merits of a case is largely an illusory 
distinction; it is a distinction without a difference.186  Since an 
analysis of a plaintiff’s standing requires a court to consider not 
 
182 Id. 
183 827 F.2d 1058, 1065–66 (6th Cir. 1987). 
184 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992) (finding that a violation of the 
Establishment Clause is not predicated on the coercion test).  
185 See id. at 591–92. 
186 See Howard M. Wasserman, Fletcherian Standing, Merits, and Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 257, 264 (2015). Professor Wasserman states:  
If more legal issues are treated as merits rather than the Article III 
subject-matter jurisdiction threshold, it makes sense to do the same with the 
merits as compared with the Article III standing threshold. Like statutory 
facts such as whether the defendant qualifies as an employer or whether the 
plaintiff is a person protected by the statute, the elements of standing—
injury in fact, causation, and redressability—go to who can sue whom for 
what conduct and what remedy. If that question goes to the underlying 
merits in the context of subject-matter jurisdiction, it also should go to the 
merits in the context of standing. 
Unfortunately, the Court has been less ready to acknowledge standing as 
erroneously constitutionalized merits to the same extent it has with 
adjudicative jurisdiction.  
Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
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only whether the plaintiff was injured, but also whether the injury 
was caused by the defendant, a court must sometimes delve into 
the merits of a claim—particularly where causation is an element 
of the claim—to rule on the threshold matter of standing.187 
Second, and more importantly, although the coercion issue 
typically comes up in establishment cases, it might fit better in 
free exercise cases—and some establishment cases might better be 
framed as free exercise cases.  For example, when a public school 
forces a student—a non-adherent to majoritarian religious 
beliefs—to participate in a pre-class prayer, one issue is obviously 
whether the school has thereby established religion.188  In that 
context, the Supreme Court has applied the coercion test to 
determine whether a student has been made to feel like an 
outsider.189  But the better question might be whether, by 
compelling this kind of participation, the school has violated the 
free exercise rights of the student.  The issue of whether the 
student has been made to violate his or her own beliefs in an active 
and kinetic way seems more on point than the question of whether 
the school was promoting religion in a way that constituted 
establishment—although again, that question is clearly relevant.  
And what better way exists to decide whether a person’s free 
exercise rights have been violated than to ask whether the person 
has been forced—coerced—to participate in or practice an overtly 
religious undertaking or to abstain from an overtly religious 
undertaking?190  It would be hard to imagine a more common-sense 
approach to the issue of free exercise and to the question whether 
a plaintiff has suffered a free exercise injury. 
Nonetheless, the coercion standard as a component of 
standing doctrine in free exercise cases is unlikely to survive the 
new Supreme Court majority for long.  If a plaintiff may allege a 
free exercise injury merely by dint of her having to provide health 
insurance coverage to an employee,191 having to sign and submit a 
 
187 See Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III Standing: A 
Proposed Solution to the Serious (But Unrecognized) Separation of Powers Problem, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1407 (2014) (recognizing the argument that “causation, one 
of standing’s three prongs, is often a key merits issue”). 
188 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 41–42 (1985).  
189 See id. at 42 (noting the allegation that “children were exposed to ostracism 
from their peer group class members if they did not participate” in the prayer).  
190 Accord Nikolao v. Lyon, 875 F.3d 310, 316 (6th Cir. 2017). 
191 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 719 (2014). 
2019]	 FREE	EXERCISE	STANDING	 621	
form to opt out of providing such coverage,192 or having to exist 
without state assistance in repaving a playground,193 then surely 
a plaintiff who has had to submit herself to state counseling as to 
religious matters, with all the time and angst involved in that 
process,194 has suffered an injury as well.  In fact, it would be a free 
exercise injury to be required under the law to have a child 
vaccinated at all, never mind having also to explain oneself to the 
state and be lectured by medical professionals.195 
The argument that the plaintiff in Nikolao was not required 
to do anything religious would seem to be unavailing in light of the 
prophylactic approach to free exercise now prevailing among 
conservative federal judges.  Providing health insurance is not 
religious, and neither is complying with bureaucratic form-filling 
requirements.  Nor, of course, is paving a playground.  In Nikolao, 
since state health officials counseled the plaintiff about religious 
beliefs as to vaccinations, there actually was a religious component 
to the activity the plaintiff was forced to undertake.  More to the 
point, though, it would not have mattered were the entire 
undertaking devoid of any religious references.  The state’s failure 
to abide and accommodate the plaintiff’s religious beliefs, no 
matter how nonreligious the context, was a concrete and palpable 
injury if federal courts are to abide the approach reflected in 
Burwell, Masterpiece Cake Shop, Trinity Lutheran Church, and 
Priests for Life.  As journalist Katherine Stewart noted: 
In his dissenting opinion in Priests for Life v. Health and Human 
Services, Judge Kavanaugh argued that requiring an 
organization to fill out a one-page form that would have exempted 
it from providing contraception coverage imposed a “substantial 
burden” on its free exercise of religion.  He appears to feel keenly 
the anguish of priests and nuns living in a nation where  
women have a range of lawfully and medically supported health 
care options.196 
We end where we began:  anguish and angst, in the coming age of 
prophylactic free exercise, will be regarded as concrete and 
palpable injuries.  
 
192 See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 808 F.3d. 1,17 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
193 See Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017, 2022 (2017). 
194 See Nikolao, 875 F.3d at 314, 316. 
195 See id. at 314.  
196 Stewart, supra note 74. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the future, should the Court adopt the dynamic view of free 
exercise, the coercion standard endorsed in Nikolao would be 
appropriate.  As it stands today, however, the dynamic view of free 
exercise seems to command only a minority on the Court.  
According to Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent in the denial of 
rehearing the case Priests for Life en banc, the problem under the 
ACA was that plaintiffs, by filling out and filing a form, were 
required to participate in their employees’ choices to access 
contraceptive care.  Under this logic, when I must release others 
from the strictures of my own beliefs, I am no longer free—free to 
involve myself in the behavior of others and conform them to my 
own preferences, or at least to try; free to exist without the 
awareness that I am not in control; and free to participate in a 
society where my own God, through me and my fealty to His will, 
is sovereign.  If I am a believer and you are not, then you are not 
free from my involvement in your life; to abide my own right to 
free exercise, you must participate in my project and my mission. 
